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Real or Illusory Growth in an Oil-Based 
Economy: Government Expenditures and Private 
Sector Investment in Saudi Arabia 
ROBERT E. LOONEY* 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
Summary. - The purpose of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent "Dutch 
Disease" effects have offset the potentially positive Hirschman-type inducements provided by 
massive government expenditures intended to stimulate private sector investment in Saudi 
Arabia. The main finding is that in Saudi Arabia at least infrastructure investment does not 
appear to have played a strong role in stimulating private sector investment. Instead, the private 
investors appear to be much more sensitive to shorter run current conditions created by 
government expenditures. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the major oil-exporting developing 
countries have relied to one extent or another on 
a variant of Hirschman's (1958) policy of un-
balanced growth. This approach stresses the 
supply-side effects produced by massive invest-
ments in social overhead capital (Looney, 
1989b). Since the 1973174 oil price revolution 
Saudi Arabia, for example, has allocated ap-
proximately 375 billion riyals (Ris) to develop-
ment infrastructure (during most of this period 
tbe exchange rate was around 3.5 Rls to the US 
dollar). 
Given the extent of these expenditures, 
however, the economy's economic performance 
in recent years must be considered a major 
disappointment, with private investment falling 
in real terms each year since 1981182. As docu-
mented and predicted in Auty's seminal work 
(1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989) industrial diversifica-
tion has been somewhat disappointing. 
A number of reasons for the country's current 
economic problems have been suggested 
(Looney, 1988c, 1990). Some are specific and 
relate to relative price movements associated 
with the Dutch Disease - the decline in profita-
bility of traded goods stemming from an over-
valued exchange rate created by the oil boom. In 
fact, there is increasing evidence of the existence 
of the Dutch Disease in Saudi Arabia (Looney, 
1988/89). 
Other explanations are more general and 
relate to the quality and composition of govern-
ment expenditures. Finally, institutional factors 
such as restrictions on the earning of interest, 
have most likely encouraged commercial banks 
(and presumably private investors) to shift funds 
to foreign capital markets, particularly during 
periods of relatively high euro-interest rates 
(Wilson, 1982). 
The purpose of this paper is to determine 
which of these factors have offset the potentially 
positive Hirschman-type inducements to private 
sector investment. Based on these findings, 
several policy implications are drawn. With this 
end in mind, the following section provides a 
brief overview of the government's development 
plans and expenditure patterns. Since the ulti-
mate intent of government policy is to stimulate 
private sector activity, especially investment, the 
next section develops a private sector investment 
function, incorporating the stimulative effects of 
government expenditures together with variables 
depicting the possible offsets or negative effects 





Economic development policies in Saudi Ara-
bia have been carried out since 1970s in a series 
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of five-year plans. These plans set physical 
infrastructural targets and provide an overall 
spending framework. The Second Development 
Plan's (1975-80) main objectives were to main-
tain a high rate of economic growth, reduce 
dependence on oil, develop indigenous human 
resources, and develop physical infrastructure. 
The Third and Fourth plans maintained these 
central goals, but elaborated on certain specifics. 
The Third Plan, for instance, placed particular 
emphasis on restraining growth of the expatriate 
labor force and on promoting growth in agricul-
ture, industry and mining. Because of the anti-
cipated greater involvement of the private sector 
in economic development during the Fourth 
Plan, the planning authorities adopted a new 
methodology that concentrated on programs and 
policies rather than specific projects and targets 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988, pp. 112-
113). 
On the expenditure side, the striking pattern 
characterizing Saudi Arabia's development has 
been the rapid expansion of government expend-
itures (Looney and Frederiksen, 1988). In parti-
cular, government investment as a percentage of 
total investment increased from slightly under 
7% in 1960 to 42.9% in 1965, 53.3% in 1970, and 
72.6% in 1980. The public sector's share in 
investment declined somewhat to around 55% in 
the late 1980s. Similarly, public sector consump-
tion increased from slightly over 20% of total 
consumption in 1960 to 36.5% in 1965, 46.9% in 
1975, 43.1 % in 1980, and to around 45% in the 
late 1980s. The net result of these trends is that 
the expenditures of the public sector have risen 
as a percentage of total expenditures from 
around 20% in 1960 to slightly under 50% in the 
late 1980s. 
While the 1970s were characterized by a 
government investment boom, there has been a 
steady downgrading of spending on infrastruc-
ture in the 1980s. In part this trend reflects the 
completion of many of the major infrastructural 
projects begun after the start of the oil boom. It 
is also indicative, however, of the general decline 
in oil revenues after 1982 and the manner in 
which the government has managed austerity 
(Looney 1991). 
3. DETERMINANTS OF SAUDI ARABIAN 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
Much of the existing literature (Blejer and 
Khan, 1984; Tun Wai and Wong, 1982) on 
private sector investment in developing countries 
argues that public investment involves both the 
development of infrastructure which would prob-
ably be complementary with private investment, 
and other types of consumption and noninfra-
structural investment which may compete with 
private investment either through absorbing 
limited physical resources or through the produc-
tion of marketable output. In the aggregate, the 
effects of the infrastructural and noninfrastruc-
tural components can offset each other, thereby 
yielding the impression that the impact of total 
government investment on the level of private 
investment is weak or insignificant. 
Blejer and Khan (1985) have, however, shown 
that once the two aspects of public sector 
investment are recognized and a distinction is 
made along functional lines involving infrastruc-
tural and noninfrastructural investment and con-
sumption, considerably stronger statements can 
be made of the role of government in private 
capital formation. Following Blejer and Khan, 
the model developed below attempts to capture 
some of the institutional and structural character-
istics of the Saudi Arabian economy. Suffice to 
say that a number of problems (Abdeen and 
Shook, 1984) tend to limit the applicability of a 
strict version of the neoclassical investment 
model set forth by Jorgenson (1967, 1971). 
As a starting point, it is reasonable to assume 
that private investors in Saudi Arabia undertake 
investment to bridge the gap between their actual 
capital stocks and perceived optimal levels. 
Following Blejer and Kahn the process takes 
place as follows: 
DIP (t) = b [IP* (t) - IP (t - 1)]. (a) 
Where IP* is the desired level of gross private 
investment; IP is the actual level of gross private 
investment; b is the coefficient of adjustment 
with b greater than or equal to zero and less than 
or equal to one, and Dis a difference operator in 
the steady state. The desired rate of gross private 
investment can be related to the desired stock of 
private capital KP* in the following manner: 
IP* (t) = [1 - (1- z) L] KP* (t). (b) 
Where z is the rate of depreciation and L is a 
Jag operator - LKP (t) = KP (t - 1). 
In the Jong run, the desired stock of capital is 
assumed to be a function of lagged real output, 
YR (t - 1), and/or real oil revenues OIL (t). 
KP* (t) = a [YR (t - 1), OIL (t)]. (c) 
Combining equations a - c and solving for IP (t) 
yields the basic dynamic accelerator function: 
IP (t) = [1 - (1 - z) L] ba Y (t - 1), OIL (t) + 
(1 - b) IP (t - 1). (d) 
As to the role of public investment and other 
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factors in the rate of private capital formation, 
we hypothesize that the response of gross private 
investment to the gap between desired and actual 
investment, as measured by b in equation (a) is 
not a fixed parameter, but rather varies systema-
tically with economic factors that influence the 
ability and willingness of private investors to 
achieve the desired level of investment. 
Here the ability of the private sector to 
respond depends on two main factors: first, the 
availability of financing, and second, the level of 
public sector investment. Finally, expectations of 
future economic conditions, and the attractive-
ness of alternative uses for investment funds 
determine the short-run willingness to bridge the 
gap between actual and optimal capital stocks. 
As for credit, in recent years a clear consensus 
has emerged that, in contrast to the case of 
industrial economies, one of the principal con-
straints on investment in developing countries is 
the quantity of financial resources rather· than 
their costs. The rudimentary nature of capital 
markets in Saudi Arabia, however, limits the 
financing of private investment to the use of 
retained profits, bank credit and, in particular, 
government subsidies. An increase in real credit 
to the private sector will, other things being 
equal, directly encourage real private sector 
investment, and by rolling over bank loans, the 
maturity of debt can be lengthened sufficiently to 
correspond to the length of the invest~ent 
project. 
In terms of government investment, increased 
infrastructure (a la Hirschman's unbalanced 
growth strategy) should, through reducing the 
cost of private sector production, increase the 
profitability of directly productive activity (DPA) 
and hence private investment. On the other 
hand, increased pessimism about future eco-
nomic conditions, and/or attractiveness of 
foreign investment possibilities would tend to 
reduce the willingness of private invetors to 
divert investment toward domestic projects. In 
addition, there is considerable evidence that 
Saudi banks increase holdings of foreign assets 
during periods of high real euro-interest rates 
(Looney, 1987). Ceteris paribus, relatively high 
real euro-rates should most likely divert funds 
away from domestic capital formation. 
As noted earlier, recent analysis (Looney, 
1988/89) of sectoral growth rates has confirmed 
the presence in Saudi Arabia of the so-called 
Dutch Disease. This phenomenon operates 
through the overvaluation of the exchange rate 
brought about by the increase in price of non-
tradables relative to tradables following stepped 
up levels of oil-financed government expendi-
tures. The increase in relative profitability of 
nontradables enables these activities to bid re-
sources (both actual and potential) from tradable 
activities - mainly agriculture and manufactur-
ing. 
Using a three-sector model with the booming 
sector (oil), nontraded goods and traded goods 
sectors, Kamas (1986, p. 1178) has summarized 
the effects of the primary export boom: the 
increased profitability in the booming export 
sector pulls resources out of the other traded and 
nontraded sectors, causing output to decline, 
while higher spending (along with the resource 
movement) increases the relative price of non-
traded goods, pulling resources from both the 
booming sector and the other traded-goods 
sectors. There is an unambiguous decline in the 
other traded-goods sector while the net effect on 
output in the nontraded and the booming sectors 
are indeterminate. While the overall trade 
balance is back to zero in the final equilibrium, 
net exports of the other traded-goods sectors fall 
while consumption increases. This effect has 
received less emphasis in the literature than the 
deindustrialization effect, yet it represents an 
increased dependence on the primary export at 
the expense of manufactured or other nonboom-
ing sectors. Clearly this is undesirable from the 
perspective of Saudi Arabia's economic diversifi-
cation objectives. 
As Kamas (1986, p. 1178) notes diagnostic 
tests for the Dutch Disease should look for the 
following symptoms: (a) an increase in the 
relative price of nontraded goods or an appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate; (b) a decline 
in output in nonbooming tradable goods and a 
very likely increase in nontraded production and 
(c) a decline in exports on nonbooming traded 
goods. 
Unfortunately the data on Saudi Arabian 
private sector investment are not broken down 
by tradable/nontradable activities. Given this 
fact, it is impossible to specify a priori a sign for 
increases in the real exchange rate in the equa-
tion for private sector investment. Instead, we 
simply assume (as is very likely) that the great 
bulk of private sector investment was in trad-
ables. On the assumption of limited possibilities 
for investment in nontradables, exchange rate 
-appreciation should, ceteris paribus, reduce the 
rate of increase in private capital formation from 
what it might otherwise have been. 
To summarize, on the basis of the arguments 
above, we can express the coefficient of adjust-
ment in equation (a) as a function of the change 
in subsidized real bank credit, infrastructure 
development, Dutch Disease factors, the profita-
bility of foreign investment, and expectations of 
the profitability of domestic investment. 
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b (t) = bO + Vx* [bl /CR (t) + b2 GI (t) + b3 
REX (t) - b4 EUROR (t) + b4 
INFE (t)]. (e) 
Where: x* = IP* (t) - IP (t - 1), /CR = the 
real level of subsidized credit provided to indus-
try by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
(Johany, Berne and Mixon, 1986, chapter 13). 
GI, the level of real government investment, 
REX, the real Riyal/dollar exchange rate (com-
puted as the nominal exchange rate times the 
import price index, divided by the nonoil GDP 
deflator). On the assumption that the great bulk 
of Saudi Arabian private investment was in 
tradables its expected sign is positive (since larger 
values reflect a weaker real Saudi Riyal). 
EUROR is the real euro-rate of interest (defined 
as the euro-dollar rate in London - line 60d for 
the UK in International Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Statistics minus the annual rate of 
change in export prices of the advanced industrial 
countries). Finally, expectations concerning the 
profitability of domestic investment, /NFE are 
proxied by the expected rate of domestic infla-
tion. Expected inflation was estimated from the 
equation: 
INFE (t = a + b [INF (t - l)]. 
Where INF = the expected nonoil GDP price 
deflator, and INF = the nonoil GDP price 
deflator. 
Equation ( e) states that the response of private 
investment depends on the magnitude of these 
factors measured in relative terms with respect to 
the size of the discrepancy between desired and 
actual investment, 
[IP* (t) - IP (t - l)]. 
coefficient of adjustment, b (t) depend on both 
the level (GI) and the change in public sector 
investment (DGI). This yields: 
IP (t) = bOa [YR (t - 1) - (1 - c) YR (t - 2)] + 
bl /CR (t) + b2 GI (t) + b3 REX (t) -
b4 EURO (t) + b5 /NFE (t) + b6 DGI 
(t) + (1 - bO) IP (t - 1). (h) 
The direct effects of government policy on 
private investment can be obtained from the 
estimates of bl and b2 (and b6 in equation h), 
while indirect effects are represented by b3, b4 
and b5. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Preliminary estimates1 using a shortened ver-
sion of this model, however, indicated that 
private sector investment is insensitive to changes 
in real nonoil GDP2: 
IP = 0.98 IPL + 0.06 DYL + 0.14 /CR -
(17.57) (0.07) (2.53) 
0.41 RHO 
(-2.03) 
r2 = 0.980; F = 262.29; DW = L90. (1) 
Where DYL is the accelerator [Y (t - 1) - Y (t -
2)] with Y = real nonoil GDP; IPL= IP (t - 1). 
Substituting real oil revenues for the simple 
accelerator yielded: 
IP = 0.87 IPL + 0.31 OIL + 0.08 /CR -
(17.15) (3.02) (2.04) 
0.47 RHO 
(-2.39) 
Substituting equation (e) into equation (a) r2 = 0.998; F = 448.60; DW = 1.91. (2) 
yields: It appears from equation (1) that private 
IP (t) = bO (IP* (t) - IP (t - l)] + bl /CR (t) + investment in Saudi Arabia experiences a strong 
b2 GI (t) + b3 REX (t) - b4 EURO (t) Koyck (1954) distributed lag. This is apparent 
+ b5 INFE (t). (f) from the statistical significance of the lagged 
Since from equations (b) and (c) we show that: (IPL) private investment term. Distributed Jags 
are a common phenomena in Saudi Arabia, and 
IP* (t) = bOa [YR (t - 1) - (1 - c) YR (t - 2)] in large part reflect adjustments to oil shocks 
+bl /CR (t) + b2 GI (t) + b3 REX - (Looney, 1984), with investment expanding and 
b4 EURO (t) + b5 INFE (t) + contracting over time to sharper changes in oil 
(1 - bO) IP (t - 1). revenues and subsidized credit. 
We can now derive a dynamic reduced from • This patter.n doe~ no~ hold true, however.' 
equation for gross private investment: when expanding estimation to the full model. 
IP (t) = bOa [YR (t - 1) - (1 - c) YR (t - 2)] + 
bl /CR (t) + b2 GI (t) + b3 REX (t) -
b4 EURO (t) + b5 /NFE (t) + (1 - bO) 
IP (t - 1). (g) 
This equation can be extended to make the 
IP= 0.11 IPL + 0.56 OIL + 0.17 /CR -
(0.54) (7.24) (6.85) 
0.30 GI + 1.43 REX - 0.99 EURO + 
(-8.13) (3.77) (-2.94) 
1.49 INFE - 0.84 RHO 
(7 .97) (-6.86) 
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r2 = 0.999; F = 2294.15; DW = 1.78. (3) 
Adding the change in government investment 
(DGI): 
IP= 0.11 IPL - 0.56 OIL+ 0.17 !CR -
(0.95) (8.00) (7.78) 
0.39 GI+ 2.18 REX - 0.10 EURO+ 
(-6.96) (4.10) (-3.51) 
1.81 INFE + 0.05 DGI - 0.88 RHO 
(7.48) (1.83) (-8.21) 
r2 = 0.999; F = 2495.65; DW = 2.12. (4) 
Several interesting patterns emerge from equa-
tions (3) and (4). First, when all the relevant 
variables are accounted for and introduced into 
the private investment equation, the distributed 
lag adjustment pattern is no longer significant 
(evidenced by the low t statistic on lagged private 
sector investment, IPL). Second, contrary to 
expectations, massive increases in infrastructure 
have not stimulated private investment. Further-
more, there is only a very weak link between 
changes in government investment, DG/, and 
private investment. Third, Dutch Disease effects 
(as proxied by the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate) do appear to be present in Saudi 
Arabia, retarding over time the expansion of 
private sector investment. Fourth, consistent 
with the analysis of commercial bank foreign 
assets (estimated equations (3) and ( 4) above), 
high external rates of return divert investment 
funds into foreign assets. Fifth, expectations of 
future profitability appear to have a significant 
impact on the private sector's decision to invest 
domestically. In addition to expected inflation, 
several other variables: (a) expected increase in 
nonoil GDP, and (b) expected government 
consumption expenditures were tested as proxies 
for expected future profitability of domestic 
investment. None of these variables, however, 
were statistically significant. 
Given the fact that infrastructure investment 
has been the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia's 
development strategy, and the widespread belief 
in the kingdom that public sector investment 
plays a relatively important role in private capital 
formation, the results obtained above are cer-
tainly surprising. One explanation may lie in the 
use of real government investment as a proxy for 
the state's investment in infrastructure. Thrs 
figure comprises both infrastructural and non-
infrastructural components of public investment. 
It is quite possible that each of these elements 
affects private investment in fundamentally dif-
ferent ways, causing them to offset one another 
(for example, absorptive capacity problems asso-
ciated with the noninfrastructural component 
raising costs of labor, and the like sufficiently to 
neutralize any cost reductions associated with the 
infrastructural component). 
Clearly, it would be more meaningful to 
separate and estimate the independent effects of 
the different categories of public investment. 
Unfortunately the government does not publish 
data at this level of disaggregation. 
· One way of getting around this problem is to 
develop alternative proxies for infrastructural 
and noninfrastructural components. The basic 
assumption underlying these proxies is that 
infrastructure investment, especially in areas 
such as transport, is an ongoing process that 
moves slowly over time and cannot be changed 
very rapidly. The first of the two approaches 
takes the trend level of real public sector 
investment (GILT) as representing the long-term 
or infrastructural component and argues that this 
should have a positive effect on gross real private 
investment; deviations from the trend (GIDLT) 
are assumed to represent noninfrastructural in-
vestment. 
A final factor that needs to be taken into 
account is the potential problem of real or 
physical crowding out (Looney and Frederiksen, 
1987). It is a well-accepted proposition that in 
Saudi Arabia absorptive capacity has been a 
problem, particularly in the early oil boom years. 
By definition, public sector expenditure can 
result in crowding out if it utilizes physical and 
financial resources that would otherwise go to the 
private sector. Furthermore, the financing of 
public sector investment, whether through taxes, 
issuance of debt or inflation will lower the 
resources available for the private sector and thus 
depress private investment activity. These effects 
should not be a major factor in Saudi Arabia, 
however, given the government's resource base, 
lack of debt and inflation. Operationally, a 
negative sign on the noninfrastructural term, 
GIDLT (GI (t) - GILT (t)], can be assumed to 
reflect crowding out of private sector investment 
due to excessive allocations to noninfrastructural 
uses. 
Finally, because of the apparent responsive-
ness of the private sector to increases in credit, 
the expected level of commerical bank credit 
(divided in a manner similar to that described 
above for expected inflationi CRE, was included 
in the regression equation. Adding the Dutch 
Disease and foreign rates of return yielded: 
!PP= 0.47 CRE + 0.64 OIL+ 0.15 !CR -
(2.18) (7 .20) (3.84) 
0.22 GILT - 0.28 GIDLT + 0.62 INFE 
(-3.28) (-4.41) (2.24) 
- 0.69 RHO 
(-4.16) 
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r2 = 0.9983; F = 983.27; DW = 1.86 (5) r2 = 0.999; F = 2186.54; DW = 1.72 (10) 
/PP= 0.20 CRE + 0.46 OIL+ 0.16 /CR -
(1.11) (5.50) (5.27) 
0.32 GILT - 0.17 GIDLT + 1.60 INFE 
(-5.62) (-3.13) (4.42) 
+ 2.30 REX - 0.80 RHO 
(3.32) ( -6.00) 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1673.39; DW = 2.07 (6) 
/PP= 0.10 CRE + 0.56 OIL+ 0.14 ICR -
(0.66) (7.35) (5.54) 
0.35 GILT- 0.24 GIDLT + 1.66 INFE 
(-7.44) (-4.66) (5.73) 




r2 = 0.999; F = 2317.63; DW = 2.03 (7) 
A variant on this approach is to make a 
distinction between types of public investment on 
the basis of whether investment is expected 
(again, calculated in a manner similar to the 
expected values noted above). Here it is assumed 
that expected public investment, GIE, represents 
allocations of public investment for intrastruc-
ture, while unanticipated public investment, 
GIU, is assumed to be the difference between 
actual expenditures and expected expenditures, 
and represents the noninfrastructural component 
of public investment. Here it is assumed that a 
negative sign on the unanticipated public invest-
ment expenditures term is indicative of real 
crowding out. The results: 
/PP= 0.52 CRE + 0.70 OIL+ 0.11 ICR -
(2.60) (9.28) (3.92) 
0.27 G/E - 0.18 GIU + 0.67 INFE -
(-5.32) (-2.39) (2.50) 
0.70 RHO 
(-4.36) 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1062.39; DW = 1.70 (8) 
/PP= 0.26 CRE + 0.51 OIL+ 0.16 ICR -
(1.41) (5.93) (5.78) 
0.27 GIE - 0.17 GIU + 1.26 INFE + 
(-6.94) (2.83) ( 4.38) 
1.51 REX - 0.76 RHO 
(3.03) (-5.38) 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1600.39; DW = 1.88 (9) 
/PP= 0.14 CRE - 0.59 OIL + 0.14 /CR -
(0.91) (7.76) (5.89) 
0.31 GIE - 0.24 GIU + 1.41 INFE + 
(-8.77) (-4.20) (5.77) 
1.36 REX - 0.86 EURO - 0.84 RHO 
(3.34) (-2.52) (-7.19) 
Again the results obtained for the impact of 
infrastructural investment on private sector in-
vestment are somewhat surprising. It appears 
that the infrastructure component of government 
investment (expected government investment) 
has had a negative impact on private sector 
capital formation. Unexpected increases in 
government investment or deviations from the 
long-run trend in public investment (the non-
infrastructural components) may also have re-
sulted in some real crowding out of private sector 
investment. Capital flight and the Dutch Disease 
effects were also important in reducing domestic 
private capital formation. 
As noted, in recent years government con-
sumption has been increasing it share in total 
public sector expenditures. Particularly since the 
1982 oil price declines, the government appears 
to be shifting toward shorter run programs and 
away from the massive infrastructural invest-
ments of the late 1970s. Has this switch done 
anything to affect the private sector perception of 
future rates of return on domestic investment? 
To test for the effect of government consump-
tion, the expected level of real government 
consumption, GCE, was introduced into the 
regression equation. The result: 
/PP= 0.22 CRE + 0.67 OIL+ 0.10 /CR -
(1.07) (7.34) (2.75) 
0.19 GIE + 0.70 INFE + 0.98 REX -
(-4.52) (3.02) (1.37) 
0.35 EURO + 0.10 GCE - 0.70 RHO 
(-1. 77) (3.35) (-4.49) 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1184.10; DW = 1.87 (11) 
Dropping expected commercial bank credit: 
/PP = 0.66 OIL + 0.16 /CR - 0.21 G/E + 
(6.94) (2.62) (-4.83) 
0.86 INFE + 0.90 REX - 0.40 EURO 
(4.61) (1.24) (-1.95) 
+ 0.13 GCE - 0.55 RHO 
(5.79) (-3.21) 
r2 0.998; F = 1175.95; DW = 1.90 (12) 
• 5. IMPLICATIONS 
Apparently, the Saudi private sector responds 
more to shorter run stimuli than longer term 
advantages provided by infrastructure. Expected 
government consumption, inflation, oil revenues 
and subsidized credit all exert a positive and 
highly significant effect on private investors. To a 
certain extent, however, this stimulus is offset by 
government investment preempting resources 
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from the private sector, together with fairly weak 
Dutch Disease and capital flight effects. 
In sum, infrastructure investment does not 
appear to have played a strong role in stimulating 
private sector investment as predicted by Hirsch-
man. Instead the private investors appear to be 
much .more sensitive to shorter run current 
conditions created by government expenditures, 
i.e., investors apparently need a steady infusion 
of subsidies and/or direct incentives to sustain 
their enthusiasm for domestic capital formation. 
Evidently, if these are not forthcoming, the 
private sector is inclined to shift their wealth into 
foreign assets. This pattern is, of course, rein-
forced during periods of rising euro-interest 
rates. It seems that the potential supply-side cost 
reductions associated with infrastructural invest-
ment, the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia's free 
market development strategy, are either too 
subtle or insufficient in this environment to 
attract follow-on domestic investments. 
6.CONCLUSIONS 
Many of the problems currently faced by the 
mineral/oil developing country exporters stem 
from the inability of their governments to effec-
tively "sow the oil" for the purposes of creating a 
viable and dynamic nonoil sector. As Gelb's 
(1986, 1988) research has shown, the record so 
far suggests that for this group of countries, the 
benefits have been far smaller than expected. 
According to Gelb's findings (1986, pp. 28-29) 
this has come about partly because of the 
increased uncertainty which accompanied the 
windfall, partly due to the asymmetry of 
macroeconomic adjustments, and partly to the 
low quality of much public capital formation. 
The results obtained above are in broad 
agreement with Gelb's analysis. They are also 
consistent with those of Auty (1989a, 1988b, 
1988c, 1989) whose analysis provides another 
dimension of the industrial diversification prob-
lem in oil-exporting states. In this regard, the 
findings presented here contain both optimistic 
and pessimistic implications for the Saudi eco-
nomy over the next few years of slack oil 
revenues. First, the results indicate that the 
private sector is reponsive to government initia-
tives. In particular, government consumption' 
(presumably that including a subsidy element) 
can, given existing levels of infrastructure, stimu-
late further private sector investments. In this 
sense the recent shift in the composition of 
government expenditures away from investment 
and toward consumption may have been a wise 
decision. In any case, given the extremely high 
cost of infrastructure, the government may, by 
increasing the share of expenditures going to 
consumption, have found a cost-effective way of 
stimulating the private sector to pick up some of 
the slack associated with overall reduced levels of 
government expenditure. 
On the other hand, while not conclusive 
because of the lack of private sector investment 
data by sector (tradables vs nontradables) the 
above findings are consistent with the conditions 
predicted by a growing body of literature on 
Dutch Disease (Corden, 1984; Roemer, 1985; 
Neary and van Wijnbergen, 1986; Kamas, 1986; 
Parvin and Dezhbakhsh, 1988; and al-Sabah, 
1988). Summarizing much of this literature, 
Lewis (1984) notes that oil-financed government 
expenditures create, in addition to the exchange 
and interest distinctions noted above, an environ-
ment whereby: 
(a) There is a natural relaxation of discipline 
by the government in overall fiscal matters. 
(b) Government officials attempting to utilize 
the additional resources productively, move 
increasingly toward large-scale capital-
intensive, long-gestation projects which utilize 
large lumps of available capital. 
(c) The push to spend resources coupled with 
the limited capacity of the government to 
manage large programs leads to wasteful and 
poorly conceived projects. 
(d) The government, because it has been 
unable to absorb enough of the new surplus in 
public sector projects, attempts to channel 
resources to the private sector, yet the govern-
ment is ill-suited to serve as a financial 
intermediary. 
( e) The private sector has been less able to 
respond because the government's own 
growth has crowded out private firms' access 
to scarce managerial and technical skills. 
(f) Private investors become infected with a 
retainer ethos, demanding quick high returns 
on investment and unless directly subsidized, 
concentrate their resources on speculative 
ventures (property), rather than directly pro-
ductive plant and equipment (DPA). 
Clearly many of these conditions appear to be 
present to some degree in Saudi Arabia. While it 
is impossible at this time to determine precise 
magnitudes of the various factors discouraging 
private sector investment, their simple presence 
suggests that the country's economic future may 
not be as assured as was felt only a few years ago. 
More specifically, the results obtained above 
suggest that Saudi Arabia's growth may not be 
sustainable and may in fact be largely an illusion. 
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Real development can only be achieved out of 
rate of DPA which is sustainable. If in fact 
private investment in DPA in Saudi Arabia has 
only been stimulated by short-run (and con-
tinuous) subsidies rather than the longer run 
supply-side incentives provided by the gov-
ernment's massive provision of infrastructure, 
and even worse if the oil sector somehow 
undermines the country's ability to produce 
DPA, then there are serious doubts about the 
Jong-term development prospects of the King-
dom. 
NOTES 
1. Data covering 1960-88 were used in the estima-
tions. Exchange rates, interest rates, and domestic 
credit futures are from the IMF (various issues). Data 
for 1960--63 are from Al-Bashir (1977). All other data 
are from SAMA (various issues). The SAMA and IMF 
series were extended from 1964 back to 1960 by 
applying the growth rates in the respective variables 
found in Bashir's data set. 
Annual data rather than quarterly data were used in 
the estimations. In part this stemmed from difficulties 
in reconciling data from the different sources. Specifi-
cally Saudi Arabia follows the lunar calendar with 12 
months, but its year is 11 days shorte1 than the 
Gregorian calendar year. There are procedures which 
allow for transformation of the Hijra-year statistics into 
Gregorian-year statistics. Seasonal variations in Saudi 
Arabia, however, are largely related to religious 
observances - such as Ramadan, which occurs in the 
same month each year in the Hijra calendar, but which 
may shift from summer to winter when converted to the 
Gregorian calendar. The standard seasonal adjustment 
programs have difficulty dealing with such "floating" 
seasonals. In addition, seasonal dummies cannot be 
used in the nonseasonally adjusted data because ~easo­
nal changes move from year to year when translated in 
to the Gregorian calendar. 
Nominal ·values were converted to constant price 
values by deflating with the nonoil GDP deflator 
presented in the SAMA (various issues). The consumer 
price index was not used for this purpose because it 
contains a number of price-controlled items. 
There are several conceptual problems with the 
Saudi Arabian national income accounts that could not 
be reconciled here. First, oil revenues are effectively 
double counted (Barker, 1982, pp. 3-4), with the value 
added in this sector occurring once in its own right 
under "Mining and Quarrying" and again through the 
government sector whenever government expenditures 
which are almost totally funded from oil revenues, are 
made for domestic goods or services. This problem was 
largely avoided through the use of nonoil GDP in the 
regression equation. 
Because of this characteristic of the National Income 
Accounts there has been a tendency for directly 
productive nonoil activities and investment to expand 
alongside the explosion in oil. Clearly one needs 
ultimately to deal with the issue of "real" versus 
"subsidized" output of directly productive activities. As 
Stauffer (1985) has noted that much of the observed 
expansion in nonoil directly productive activity (DPA) 
has been the result of heavy subsidization of inputs 
(paid for by oil revenues) and/or the creation of 
artificial markets for the output (i.e. bought with. oil 
revenues). The results presented here indicate that t'he 
Dutch Disease effects are still strong enough to 
overcome these biases in the data. Put differently, in a 
strict sense the data are not adequate to assess the 
extent of positive impacts of oil revenues on the 
economy; however, they are adequate for arriving at 
conclusions as to the possible existence of the Dutch 
Disease. 
2. Estimates were made using a Cochrane-Orcutt 
Autocorrelation technique to correct for first-order 
autocorrelation in the disturbances. The correction 
term, RHO, is presented in the equations with its t 
statistic. See Sorites Group ( 1989) and the references 
cited there for a description of this estimation proce-
dure. 
3. As can be seen from the change in the size of the 
regression coefficients as variables are added to the 
regression equations, there is some correlation among 
the independent variables. In selecting independent 
variables we used the rules of acceptable correlation 
developed by Klein (1965). Because of unacceptability 
high levels of correlation between the different types of 
government expenditures - investment and consump-
tion - only one set of expenditures could be included 
in the regression equation at any one time (the reason. 
for example, why the government investment terms do 
not appear in equation 11). 
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